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In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was 
with God, and the Word was God.1 
‘Begin at the beginning’, the King said gravely, 
‘and go on till you come to the end: then stop’.2 
Is the beginning of a given work its real 
beginning, or is there some other, secret point that 
more authentically starts the work off?3 
Beginning at the beginning, as the King advises in 
Alice in Wonderland, makes perfect sense, but 
only if you know where the beginning begins. For, 
as Edward Said suggests, there might well be other, 
secret points of beginning, points which in turn 
complicate the establishment of origin, of 
authenticity, and, by extension, claims to 
authorship and authority. Paradoxically, 
establishing the relevance of this to Margaret 
Atwood’s dystopian projection, The Handmaid’s 
Tale, involves fast-forwarding past the end of the 
tale. Past the end of the tale, though not to the end 
of the text itself. The King’s demand to go on till 
 
1  John, 1.1. 
2 Lewis Carroll, Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (London: Methuen, 1978), 
p. 78. 
3 Edward Said, Beginnings; Intention and Method (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1978), p. 3. 
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you reach the end also makes perfect sense, but 
only if you know where the ending ends. And The 
Handmaid’s Tale ends more than a dozen pages 
after the handmaid’s tale. Only beyond the end of 
Offred’s tale, then, does fuller understanding of its 
‘beginning’ begin.  
The distinguishing of Tale from tale operates as 
a formal feature in the novel: following the end of 
Offred’s account, ‘Historical Notes’ are appended. 
And the verb fast-forwarding is appropriate, the 
‘Historical Notes’ disclosing that the tale of a 
sexual surrogate in the Christian fundamentalist 
state of Gilead has been transcribed from thirty or so 
cassette tapes. The Notes themselves are 
presented as a ‘partial transcript of the 
proceedings of the Twelfth Symposium on 
Gileadean Studies, as part of the International 
Historical Association Convention’.4 Academic 
pretension endures a mild cuffing here, though a 
more obviously important, and more startling, fact is 
subsequently revealed—the conference takes place 
in the year 2195. What for late-twentieth century 
readers has appeared a small but plausible 
historical leap into the unnerving near-future 
world of a fundamentalist dictatorship, is 
transformed, by the conceit of the conference in the 
twenty-second century, into a return to the distant past. 
 
4 Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (1985; London, Virago Press, 
1987), p. 311. All subsequent references are to the Virago edition. 
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Said’s suspicion of other, secret beginnings 
finds form in the Notes, for they detail the extent 
to which what appeared to be a provocative but 
relatively unproblematic ‘text’ has been fashioned 
by academic historians two centuries after the 
events seemingly occur. The tale itself ends in 
ambiguity, enough, Offred pondering tentatively:  
Whether this is my end or a new beginning I 
have no way of knowing: I have given myself over 
into the hands of strangers, because it can’t 
be helped. 
 And so I step up, into the darkness within; 
or else the light. (p. 307) 
But the post-tale notes establish that, while Offred 
has put herself into hands of strangers in Gilead, 
her narrative has been placed into the hands of 
strangers (in the form of historians) two hundred 
years into the future. The Notes invite, indeed demand, a 
rethinking of the ‘innocent’ reading to that point. 
Virginia Woolf’s fantasy biography, Orlando, 
prompts a similar realignment, for the eponymous 
‘hero’ dramatically changes sex on page 134 of the 
World’s Classics edition, and, over the course of five 
centuries, never ages. Gillian Beer points out that 
with Orlando ‘the reader is jestingly made aware 
of how much we believe our reading’.5 In The 
 
5 Gillian Beer, Virginia Woolf: The Common Ground (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 1996), p. 57. 
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Handmaid’s Tale, Margaret Atwood provokes the 
more serious considerations of how and why we 
believe our reading of history, and of who 
provides our reading matter. 
The Historical Notes largely consist of a 
conference paper entitled ‘Problems of 
Authentication in Reference to The Handmaid’s 
Tale’, delivered by Cambridge historian Professor 
James Pieixoto. The continuing centrality of 
powerful universities such as Cambridge 
University in analysing cultural history of itself 
deserves attention, but of more practical and 
immediate significance is Pieixoto’s account of 
the process of transcribing cassette tapes to text. 
One problem for Pieixoto and his colleague, the 
gnomically named Professor Knotly Wade, 
derived from the fact that the tapes, when initially 
discovered in an army surplus locker, ‘were in no 
particular order’. As professional historians, 
Pieixoto and Wade ‘arrange the blocks of speech 
in the order they appeared to go, but, as I have 
said elsewhere, all such arrangements are based 
on some guesswork and are to be regarded as 
approximate, pending further research’ (p. 314). 
The scholarly rectitude is laudable, though a 
harsher reading of the phrases, ‘as I have said 
elsewhere’, and ‘pending scholarly research’, 
would note the advancement of academic careers 
in tandem with academic knowledge. 
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The admission to the conference delegates of 
the provisional status of the text reinforces an 
earlier statement that ‘what we have before us is 
not the item in its original form’ (pp. 312-13). 
Once again, questions of beginnings, of origins, 
have implications, for, ‘[s]trictly speaking, it was not a 
manuscript at all’ (p. 313). Other difficulties of 
transcription involve those ‘posed by accents, 
obscure referents and archaisms’ (p. 314), but, 
interestingly, though logically, the original 
cassette tapes ‘bore no title’ (p. 313). The 
Handmaid’s Tale, Pieixoto reveals, was chosen by 
Knotly Wade, ‘partly in homage to the great 
Geoffrey Chaucer’, but partly because of the pun 
involved ‘in the archaic vulgar signification of the 
word tail’ (p. 313). This blokey aside, underlined 
by another pun playing on the associations of the 
word ‘bone’, sits oddly with the more overtly 
scholarly allusion to Chaucer. The reaction of the 
conference goers, however (registered as 
‘Laughter, applause’), suggests that Pieixoto 
shares the sense of humour of his audience, or that 
such humour is itself humoured. Evidence begins 
to accumulate, however, not only of the degree of 
scholarly fashioning of Offred’s account, but also 
of particular biases informing that scholarly work. 
These admissions alone might be troubling, but 
such concerns are reinforced by the fact that in his 
conference paper Pieixoto repeatedly has 
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difficulties with the original orality of Offred’s 
tale. At first he labels it a ‘manuscript’, before 
admitting that when first discovered it was not a 
manuscript at all. Next, he describes it as ‘an 
item—I hesitate to use the word document’ (p. 
313). Still later he explains that ‘[i]f we could 
establish an identity for the narrator, we felt, we 
might be well on the way to an explanation of 
how this document—let me call it that for the sake 
of brevity—came into being’ (p. 315). Here, as 
Said, suggests, the question of beginnings merges 
with that of authenticity and, ultimately, of 
authority. At the end of his paper Pieixoto 
dispenses entirely with his earlier hesitation, 
commenting that ‘[o]ur document, though in its 
own way eloquent , is on [a variety of topics] 
mute’ (p. 324). Tellingly, the possessive ‘our’ here 
signals a potential transfer of authority from the 
original oral teller to the text-originating scholar. 
And Pieixoto’s recourse to the trope of speech (or 
its absence) in the term ‘mute’ again suggests 
something incommensurable between textuality 
and orality, for logically and literally, a document 
can be nothing other than mute.  
The importance of this distinction for the 
historian is exposed unconsciously in Pieixoto’s 
final remarks, where he presents a particular 
conception of the past, and of the historian’s task: 
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As all historians know, the past is a great 
darkness, and filled with echoes. Voices may reach 
us from it; but what they say to us is imbued with the 
obscurity of the matrix out of which they 
come; and, try as we may, we cannot always decipher 
them precisely in the clearer light of our own day. (p. 
324)  
The past conceived as a collection of voices and 
echoes patently applies to the original oral form of 
Offred’s tale, but Pieixoto fails to appreciate that, 
speaking literally, the voices that may reach us 
from the past are no more ‘visible’ in the clearer 
light of our own day than in the dark. Crucially, 
however, the same is not true of the artefacts 
Pieixoto both creates and interprets: texts. Implicit 
in his closing remarks, then, is a distinction 
between a ‘past’ which is oral, and ‘History’ 
proper, which is textual. And as text History 
comes under the ministering hands of historians, 
becomes their possession. The handmaid’s tale 
becomes worthy of consideration at the 
International Historical Association Convention 
when it exists in its textual incarnation, The Handmaid’s 
Tale. Despite his modest recognition of the 
difficulties of deciphering even in clearer light, 
Pieixoto’s intellectual disability is not so much 
blindness as deafness. 
Pieixtoto instinctively and repeatedly favours 
the textual over the oral. ‘Accent’ is a technical 
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problem to be resolved, blocks of speech need to 
be arranged in order. Gaps in the oral account 
prove frustrating, especially for an academic 
historian: ‘Some of [these gaps] might have been 
filled by our anonymous author, had she a 
different turn of mind. She could have told us 
much about the workings of the Gileadean 
empire, had she the instincts of a reporter or a 
spy’ (p. 322). A possible solution, for the 
historian, resides in the textual: ‘What we would 
not give, now, for even twenty pages of so of 
printout from Waterford’s private computer!’ (p. 
322). In these remarks, a verbal hierarchy 
established and reinforced by Pieixoto is melded 
with that of gender, the female being linked to the 
inferior oral, the male to the superior textual. A similar 
hierarchy operates in the world of Gilead itself, 
men controlling the Bible, the textual blueprint 
and justification for that state, by keeping it 
locked away. The women’s only access is through 
the oral level, as Offred recognises: ‘We can be 
read from it, by him, but we cannot read’ (p. 98). 
Before taking this connection further, however, 
more general implications of the hierarchy 
between the textual and the oral bear consideration. 
Complaining that Offred might have filled gaps 
had she had a different turn of mind, Pieixoto 
describes her as ‘our anonymous author’, but her 
anonymity poses the problem of authentication: 
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‘[i]f we could establish an identity for the 
narrator’ (p. 315), the authenticity of the story 
could be verified. Said’s suspicion seems well 
founded that secret starting points, in this case the 
work of Pieixoto and Wade, might complicate the 
question of authenticity. Authenticity threatens to erode 
Offred’s authority over the tale, her anonymity 
reducing her to the status of mere narrator. The 
distinction between author and narrator corresponds to 
that between textual and oral, the narrator telling a 
story that the author commits to paper. In this 
circumstance the narrator cedes authority, and 
therefore control, to the author. The consequences of 
this in Offred’s case are significant, for her oral 
account is transcribed, corrected, arranged and 
named by Pieixoto and Wade. The Handmaid’s 
Tale literally (in both senses of the word) would 
not exist but for their scholarship. The 
transcription of oral to textual, then, entails the 
transfer of authorship and authority. The tale has 
one female narrator, but the Tale, seemingly, has 
two male authors.6 
The ideological implications of this situation 
are especially pertinent given the patriarchal 
dominance in Gilead itself. But questions of the 
oral account’s status in relation to the textual have 
 
6 It remains unclear (perhaps purposely) whether Professor Knotly Wade is 
male or female. The reasons behind Wade’s choice of the title suggest a 
male, but that assumption cannot be proved, and this ambiguity prevents 
simple conclusions being drawn. 
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ramifications beyond the pages of Atwood’s 
novel. The 1997 report into the separation of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander children 
from their families, for example, published as 
Bringing Them Home, incorporates oral testimony 
of ‘experiences of the removal processes’.7 
Extracts from these accounts were later gathered 
into the compilation, The Stolen Children: Their 
Stories.8 Steven Spielberg’s recent project to 
record video interviews with Holocaust survivors 
also relies on oral testimony. Yet, in each case, 
what might be taken to be simply or primarily oral 
accounts only find a reproducible, widely 
distributable, and at least semi-permanent form by 
transfer to another medium. Does this transfer 
involve the loss of authority at work in The 
Handmaid’s Tale? And do oral accounts have the 
same status as historical records as do texts? 
The Marxist historian Eric Hobsbawm, in his 
essay ‘History from Below’, acknowledges that 
most history has been written about, and perhaps 
for, ruling elites. The history of traditionally 
marginalised groups, what he terms ‘grassroots 
history’, has suffered in relation to the history of 
 
7 Bringing them Home: report of the National Inquiry into the 
Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children 
from their Families (Sydney: Human Rigths and Equal Oppurtunities 
Commission, 1997), p. 21. 
8 The Stolen Children: Their Stories, ed. Carmel Bird (Sydney: Random 
House, 1998). 
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elites, and differs from it, ‘inasmuch as there 
simply is not a readymade body of material about 
it’.9 While sympathetic to and in part a 
practitioner of ‘history from below’, Hobsbawm is 
wary of one relatively recent source of evidence with 
obvious relevance to The Handmaid’s Tale—taped 
oral history: ‘most oral history today is personal 
memory, which is a remarkably slippery medium 
for preserving facts’ (p. 206). For Hobsbawm, in 
‘Identity History is Not Enough’, the foundation 
of History as a discipline is ‘the supremacy of 
evidence’.10 Whatever the undeniable emotional 
power of oral accounts, he considers that they do 
not carry the same authority as textual evidence. 
While accepting that, in some senses, History 
might be ‘an imaginative art’, he argues that ‘it is 
one which does not invent but arranges objets 
trouvés’ (p. 272). James Pieixoto echoes this 
argument in his conference paper. He fails, 
however, to consider, or even to recognise, the 
relation between arrangement and authority. 
Within the state of Gilead, authority, and 
beginnings, are less ambiguous, for they reside in 
God’s word: ‘In the beginning was the Word, and 
the Word was with God, and the Word was God’. 
But if in the metaphysical sense the Word was 
 
9 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘History from Below’, in On History (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicholson, 1997), p. 204. 
10 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Identity History is Not Enough’, in On History, p. 271. 
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with God, in Gilead authority is invested in the 
Bible, the Word made text. The holy book 
provides that state with its name, Gilead being 
part of the Promised Land shown to Moses (Deuteronomy, 
34.1). The Bible also provides the justification for 
sexual surrogacy, Rachel offering her handmaid 
to Jacob, ‘that I may have children of her’ (Genesis, 
30.3). The Bible is controlled by men, and utilised 
for the subjugation of women. Offred underlines 
this when commenting sarcastically on the advice of 
Aunt Lydia to ‘cultivate poverty of the spirit. 
Blessed are the meek’—’[s]he didn’t go on to say 
anything about inheriting the earth’ (p. 74). The Bible 
might be seen as the authoritative historical text, 
not only recording the act of Creation but also 
‘pre-recording’ the End of Days. And yet, at the 
same time, the Bible is endlessly ‘contemporary’, 
ever able to be resurrected and invoked. The Bible 
seems to function outside history, and the control 
of it by men potentially allows them access to 
some of this power. Women, by contrast, are 
forced to operate solely in the oral realm, writing 
being denied them. Offred explains that she must 
‘tell, rather than write [her account], because I 
have nothing to write with and writing is in any 
case forbidden’ (p. 49). Forbidden to women, as 
Offred understands when she enters a ‘forbidden 
room where I have never been, where women do not 
go.... What secrets, what male totems are kept in 
here?’ (p. 147). The room is a library. 
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Ideas drawn from the work of the Russian 
literary theorist, Mikhail Bakhtin, are useful in 
dealing with issues raised not only by the 
discursive power of the Bible, but also with the 
relationship between the oral and the textual, the 
complexities of history, and of historical 
interpretation. Michael Holquist employs the term 
‘dialogism’ to consider Bakhtin’s assumption that 
dialogue is a key to an understanding not only of 
discourse, but of social relations and of history. Bakhtin 
argues that the fundamental consideration in 
language is not the single utterance, but the 
intersection of utterances in dialogue. Dialogue, 
Holquist explains, ‘is a manifold phenomenon ... 
composed of an utterance, a reply, and a relation 
between the two’.11 Speech is always oriented to 
the prospect of a reply, necessarily to some future 
event. Offred embodies this idea when she thinks 
to herself: 
I would like to believe that this is a story I’m 
telling .... 
 If it’s a story I’m telling, then I have control 
over the ending. Then there will be an ending, to 
the story, and real life will come after it. I can pick it 
up where I left off. 
 It isn’t a story I’m telling. 
 
11 Michael Holquist, Dialogism: Bakhtin and His World (London, Routledge, 
1990), p. 38. 
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 It’s also a story I’m telling, in my head, as 
I go along. 
 Tell, rather than write, because I have nothing 
to write with and writing is in any case forbidden. 
But if it’s a story, even in my head, I must be telling 
it to someone. You don’t tell a story only to yourself. 
There’s always someone else.  
 Even when there is no one. (p. 49) 
The belief in a dialogue with someone else is 
manifest, despite the realisation that that someone 
has no physical presence in the present. Offred’s 
‘dialogue’, by necessity, is with the future, though 
which future is also unknown to her, and 
unknowable. Ironically, in that future, she does 
not have control over the ending, having given up 
her account into the hands of strangers. The 
modification of the phrase ‘It isn’t a story I’m 
telling’ to ‘It’s also a story I’m telling’ plays on the 
tensions being stories as pure narrative and stories 
as fictions, potentially lies. Offred here 
unconsciously registers her own understanding of 
authenticity, authorship and authority. 
Against the dialogic aspect of language, Bakhtin 
opposes the impulse towards a single unitary 
language or sensibility, what he labels 
‘monologism’. Monologism attempts to deny the 
existence of other consciousnesses, is deaf to the 
dialogue of others. This has ideological 
ramifications, because ‘[m]onologic belief 
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systems invariably hold that a single truth is 
contained in a single situation, such as the State, 
or in a single object, such as an idol or text, or in 
single entity, such as God’.12 The pertinence of 
this to The Handmaid’s Tales is self-evident, the 
Bible functioning as a monologic text, Gilead as a 
monologic state. The threat from otherness, or 
from a dialogic plurality, is encoded in Aunt 
Lydia’s statement that ‘[w]e were a society dying ... of 
too much choice’ (p. 35). Choice involves 
something beyond the single situation, the single 
object, or the single entity. Or a single, orthodox 
language, something Holquist associates with 
totalitarian states, and which he labels ‘official 
discourse’. Such languages, he argues 
are masks for ideologies of many different 
kinds, but they all privilege oneness; the more 
powerful the ideology, the more totalitarian 
(monologic) will be the claims of its language. 
Extreme versions of such language would be 
religious systems and certain visionary forms of 
government ... 13 
The compulsion towards a single language in 
Gilead accounts for the regular Bible readings, the 
depersonalising nomenclature (Commanders; 
Handmaids; Aunts; Guardians; The Ceremony) 
 
12 Katerina Clark and Michael Holquist, Mikhail Bakhtin (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 348. 
13 Holquist, Dialogism, p. 53. 
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and most forcefully the renaming of a Handmaid 
in accordance with the name of her male Commander, as 
in Offred and Ofglen. Certain words, phrases, and 
forms are also prohibited, including ‘songs that 
used words like free. They were considered too 
dangerous’ (p. 64). The patriarchal bias of this 
control becomes clear in Offred’s shock when a 
doctor temporarily sets aside the linguistic 
straitjacket and reveals:  
‘Most of the old guys can’t make it any more ... 
Or they’re sterile’. I almost gasp: he’s said a 
forbidden word. Sterile. There is no such thing as a 
sterile man any more, not officially. There are 
only women who are barren, that’s the law. (p. 70) 
Language control reinforces official ideology, 
exonerating the male while simultaneously 
shifting blame for infertility to the female. Such 
control also paralyses the heterodox, or causes 
them to pause anxiously, as when Offred meets 
Ofglen. Wondering whether Ofglen might be a 
‘real believer’, Offred checks her curiosity by 
recognising that Ofglen ‘has never said anything 
that was not strictly orthodox, but then, neither have I ... 
I can’t take the risk’ (p. 29). 
The fundamentalist push towards official 
discourse unwittingly provides humorous 
moments, as when Offred and Ofglen engage in 
conversation: 
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‘The war is going well, I hear’, [Ofglen] says. 
‘Praise be’, I reply. 
‘We’ve been sent good weather’. 
‘Which I receive with joy’. 
‘They’ve defeated more of the rebels, since 
yesterday’. 
‘Praise be’, I say. I don’t ask how she knows. 
‘What were they?’ 
‘Baptists. They had a stronghold in the Blue 
Hills. They smoked them out’. 
‘Praise be’. (p. 29) 
 
The zany clash of registers, mixing religious 
pieties with gangster slang, substantiates 
Bakhtin’s perception that  
language is stratified not only into linguistic 
dialects ... but also—and for us this is the essential 
point—into languages that are socio-
ideological: languages of social groups, 
‘professional’ and ‘generic’ languages, languages of 
generations and so forth.14 
Discourse inherently incorporates a variety of 
languages, what Bakhtin labels ‘heteroglossia’, 
from the Greek for ‘other or different tongues’. 
For all the pressures towards linguistic and 
ideological orthodoxy in Gilead, Offred’s world is 
replete with other ‘tongues’, other supposedly 
 
14 Mikhail Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays by M.M.Bakhtin, 




prescribed languages. To take only several of 
many examples, she sings what she describes as 
the ‘lugubrious, mournful’ ‘Amazing Grace’ to 
herself, as well as ‘Heartbreak Hotel’, understanding 
both to be ‘outlawed’ songs. Suggestively, though 
unknowingly, she ‘misquotes’ the former, 
interpreting the line ‘Was blind, but now I see’, as 
‘Was bound but now am free’ (p. 64). The use of 
the word ‘free’ constitutes a liberating and 
subversive manoeuvre in Gilead, though this 
rebellion is counter-balanced by the erasing of the 
first person pronoun, with an implied loss of 
identity. Acts of linguistic subversion pervade 
Offred’s account, as when Rachel’s cry to God in 
Genesis, ‘Give me children, or else I die’, the 
fundamental fundamentalist text in Gilead, is 
queried: ‘There’s more than one meaning to it’ (p. 
71). Or, when Offred refigures Ofglen’s 
innocuous phrase ‘It’s a beautiful May Day’, 
playing on the homophonic word mayday, and 
remembering its derivation from the French word 
‘M’aidez. Help me’ (p. 54). Despite the monologic 
aspirations of the authorities in Gilead, the 
heteroglot nature of language functions as a form 
of resistance. 
The interrelation of language, memory, and 
language’s own historical aspect, plays a subtle 
but vital role in Offred’s narrative. Her tale 
incorporates not only the ‘present’ world and 
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language of Gilead, but also her own past, itself a 
source of subversive memories and phrases which 
overflow the ideological barriers of 
fundamentalist Christianity. Offred, for instance, 
plays the seemingly innocent game of ‘Scrabble’ 
with the Commander, the act prompting her realisation 
that, in using words such prolix, quartz, sylph, 
and rhythm, ‘I was using a language I had once 
known but nearly forgotten, a language having to 
do with customs that had long before passed out 
of the world’ (p. 164). At other times historical 
phrases deceive her, as in the acceptance that 
Marx and Engels’ maxim, crucially modified to read, 
‘From each according to her ability; to each 
according to his needs’ (p. 127), originates from 
the Bible.  
But a more persistently evasive, and far more 
important phrase from history is one which Offred 
first comes across by chance: 
I knelt to examine the floor, and there it was, 
in tiny writing, quite fresh it seemed, scratched with 
a pin or maybe just a fingernail, in the corner where 
the darkest shadow fell: Nolite te bastardes 
carborundorum. 
I didn’t know what it meant, or even what 
language it was in. I thought it might be Latin, but I 
didn’t know any Latin. Still, it was a message, and it 
was in writing, forbidden by that very fact, 
and it hadn’t been discovered. Except by me .... 
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It pleases me to ponder this message. It pleases 
me to think I’m communing with her, this 
unknown woman ... It pleases me to know that her 
taboo message made it through ... (p. 62) 
The discovery is rich with significance (that the 
phrase was discovered while kneeling; the sheer 
physicality of a message carved with pin or 
fingernail) but of particular interest given the 
ideas of Bakhtin are the presence of dialogic 
communication, the incorporation of an ‘other 
tongue’ into Offred’s linguistic arsenal, and the 
historical implications of that language being one 
supposedly ‘dead’—Latin. For while arguing that 
language is stratified and heteroglot, Bakhtin does 
not neglect the historical dimension: 
stratification and heteroglossia, once realised, 
is not only the static invariant of linguistic life, but 
also what ensures its dynamics: stratification and 
heteroglossia widen and deepen as long as language 
is alive and developing.15 
Heteroglossia, ‘other tongues’ , in other words, 
contribute to the dynamics of language, which 
need to be considered temporally as well as 
spatially, as stratified languages. Offred comes to 
an understanding of the phrase only over time, 
initially acknowledging it purely as a subversive 
act. Later she invokes it as a prayer, for though 
 
15 Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, p. 272. 
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still not knowing what it means, ‘it sounds right’ 
(p. 101). Eventually, the Commander translates it 
for her as ‘Don’t let the bastards grind you down’ 
(p. 197). His easy ability to translate from the 
Latin, the traditional language of intellectual 
discourse, clearly reinforces the control of ‘official 
language’ by men through history. Yet Offred’s 
instinct, that ‘it sounds right’, is confirmed, and 
the implications of the gendered term, ‘bastard’, 
are obvious, once understood. 
The dialogic dimension of language (its 
orientation towards replies; its incorporation of 
other tongues, both contemporary and historical) 
resists monologic, totalitarian impulses. And what 
holds true for language holds also for history, 
which itself is comprised of ‘other tongues’. 
James Pieixoto comments that ‘there was little 
that was truly original or indigenous to Gilead: its 
genius was synthesis’ (p. 319). Even the 
putatively monologic state, then, draws its forms 
from other moments in history, Pieixoto 
suggesting that the Handmaid’s red costume, for 
example, ‘seems to have been borrowed from the 
uniforms of German prisoners in Canadian 
“P.O.W.” camps of the Second World War era’ (p. 
319). These historical borrowings are camouflaged 
by the apparent monologic force of the Bible, 
which functions in Gilead to stifle other tongues. 
Offred recalls the lunchtime reading of the 
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Beatitudes: ‘Blessed are the merciful. Blessed are 
the meek. Blessed are the silent’. Yet she 
challenges the overtly monologic final phrase, 
commenting: ‘I knew they made that up, I knew it 
was wrong, and they left things out too, but there 
was no way of checking’ (p. 100). Memory, though 
faulty, struggles to re-establish a dialogue with 
the text. 
Offred recognises the revolutionary potential of 
such an act, in explaining why the Bible is locked up, for 
‘[i]t is an incendiary device: who knows what 
we’d make of it, if we ever got our hands on it’ (p. 
98). The ‘we’ here are women, and getting their 
hands on it allows the checking out of the text, 
comparing Gileadean dogma with the Biblical 
original. With the gaining of authority over the 
text comes the possibility of critique, and 
freedom. Furthermore, the act of reading involves 
a realisation of the dialogic nature of the Bible 
itself, for the notion of the Bible as a stable, 
coherent text is mistaken. In The Great Code, 
Northrop Frye argues that ‘the Bible is more a 
small library than a real book....[w]hat is called “the 
Bible” may only be a confused jumble of badly 
established texts’.16 Robert Carroll and Stephen 
Prickett make a similar case, pointing out how the 
transfer of the original Biblical scrolls into a 
 
16 Northrop Frye, The Great Code: The Bible and Literature (London: 
Routledge, 1982), p. xii. 
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bound manuscript, or ‘codex’, involved the 
selection of ‘which works did, or did not 
constitute the scriptures [and] the exact order in 
which the constituent works should occur’.17 One 
senses the metaphorical hand of James Pieixoto 
reaching back to perform such work. 
Against this impetus towards unity and 
standardisation of the Biblical narrative, Carroll 
and Prickett contend that it is ‘arguable that every 
grand narrative detected in the Bible breaks down 
under critical scrutiny, and that the Bible is, in 
fact, more a collection of open-ended stories and 
narratives, as in the Jewish tradition, than one 
grand narrative from creation to consummation 
imposed on it by Christianity’ (p. xxxii). The 
competing impulses of monologism and 
dialogism might be seen at work here, but the 
essential dialogism of the Bible need not be 
restricted to the textual level, for 
any reader who really begins to engage with 
the Biblical text is, in spite of the occasional 
moments of familiarity, inevitably reminded of how 
essentially alien are the worlds of both Old 
and New Testaments. (p. xxx) 
Though they do not conceive of the Bible in 
Bakhtinian terms, their argument suggests the dialogic 
 
17 Robert Carroll and Stephen Prickett, Introduction to The Bible: Authorized 
King James Version (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. xi. 
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aspect of history running through that text. The 
reader, in dealing with the historical otherness of 
the Bible, must enter into a dialogue with the past 
as presented in a text that is itself, perhaps, 
dialogic, a collection of ‘open-ended stories’ 
rather than a grand historical narrative.  
Beyond the interpretive actions necessary for 
readers of the Bible, textual and historical 
dialogism have intermeshed, practical 
implications for the state of Gilead itself. Though in 
Deuteronomy, God shows Moses Gilead as part of 
the Promised Land, in book of the prophet Amos, 
God threatens to punish ‘the transgressions of 
Damascus’ because ‘they have threshed Gilead with 
threshing instruments of iron’ (Amos, 1.3). God also 
threatens the Ammonites, ‘because they have 
ripped up the women with child of Gilead, that 
they might increase their border’ (Amos, 1.13). The 
historical destruction of the near-future Gilead 
should come as no surprise, therefore, because it 
is already written in the Book.  
Recognition of this ‘fact’ draws attention to the 
surprising optimism of The Handmaid’s Tale, in 
that the fundamentalist regime eventually, indeed 
inevitably, falls. Margaret Atwood has 
commented on this aspect, connecting her book to 
another apparently pessimistic text, George 
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four. Orwell, like Atwood, 
places his dystopia in the near future for his book’s 
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initial readers, and he also uses the literary device 
of an appended note to Winston Smith’s tale. 
Focussing on the latter point, Atwood argues that 
[m]ost people think the book ends when Winston 
comes to love Big Brother. But it doesn’t. It ends 
with a note on Newspeak, which is written in the past 
tense, in standard English—which means that, at 
the time of writing the note, Newspeak is a 
thing of the past.18  
For Atwood, the ‘Historical Notes’ in The 
Handmaid’s Tale function not only to inform, but 
also, as in her reading of Nineteen Eighty-Four, to 
suggest the historical decline of all totalitarian 
regimes. In Bahktinian terms, the monologic 
inevitably gives way to the dialogic. 
For James Pieixoto, in 2195, this state of affairs 
constitutes his reality. Gilead is of no more than 
historical interest, another tale in a narrative read 
from his own historical position. But, as an 
academic historian, he does recognise the 
interaction of different historical ‘tongues’ in 
Gilead itself: 
As we know from the study of history, no new 
system can impose itself upon a previous one 
without incorporating many of the elements to be 
found in the latter, as witness the pagan 
 
18 Margaret Atwood, in Margaret Atwood: Conversations, ed. Earl G. 
Ingersoll (Princeton, New Jersey: Ontario Review Press, 1990), p. 217.  
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elements in medieval Christianity and the evolution 
of the Russian “K.G.B.” from the Czarist secret 
service that preceded it, and Gilead was no 
exception to this rule. Its racist policies, for instance, 
were firmly rooted in the pre-Gilead period, and 
racist fears provided some of the emotional 
fuel that allowed the Gilead takeover to succeed as 
well as it did. (p. 317) 
Holquist, drawing on Bakhtin, makes the point 
that ‘the present is never a static moment, but a 
mass of different combinations of past and present 
relations’.19 For all the drive towards ideological 
homogeneity, Gilead is premised on the 
incorporation of historical forms, rituals, and 
(with the Bible) texts.  
Pieixoto’s reflection on the integration of what 
are, to him, borrowings for a distant past, 
illuminates the significance of historical 
perspective in The Handmaid’s Tale. For Pieixoto, 
the pre-Gilead period simply operates as a 
precursor to the era in which he is interested. To 
the initial readers of The Handmaid’s Tale, 
however, Pieixoto’s distant past constitutes their 
present. We, as those readers, are transformed by 
the device of the Historical Notes from observing 
subjects to observed objects. This involves not 
only a degree of self-criticism of our own 
 
19 Holquist, Dialogism, p. 37. 
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historical period, but also an examination of how 
we, as historical observers, perceive and construct 
our pasts, or our Histories. Which voices from the 
past do we hear; to which are we deaf? Do we 
listen, or is the listening done for us by historians 
with their own biases and ‘disabilities’? How do 
those ‘listeners’, those historians, transcribe the 
many pasts into History? 
Initially, the Historical Notes spring the surprise 
of a dialogue between the near-future Gilead and 
the Symposium on Gileadean Studies. But in the 
course of considering those Notes, present-day 
readers of The Handmaid’s Tale are also drawn 
into this dialogue, are forced to consider the 
acuteness of their own historical hearing, and that 
of the historians charged with committing those 
voices to text. The seemingly innocuous statement 
that the Historical Notes are a ‘partial transcript’ 
of conference proceedings hides a double, and 
double-edged, meaning—History can be partial in 
the sense of being ‘incomplete’, but also of being 
‘biased’. The answer to the implicit problem 
presented in the Historical Notes, of how we can 
begin to overcome that partiality, is suggested at 
the end of the Notes themselves. Pieixoto’s 
peroration, unconsciously uncovering his own 
historical ‘deafness’, is followed by applause, and 
the traditional conversation crusher, ‘Are there 
any questions?’ At academic conferences, such a 
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rhetorical nicety can be followed by a silence that 
is menacingly brooding, or one that is empty of 
thought. The Handmaid’s Tale ends with the 
textual equivalent of the latter—the blank page. 
But that blankness, that call for questions, which 
is left ‘unanswered’ in the text, presents a 
challenge: to open our hearing to the suppressed 
voices from the past, and to start a dialogue 
between our presents, pasts, and, by implication, 
our futures. With the ending of the text, this 
process of dialogue can begin. 
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